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THE SEC: PORTRAIT OF THE AGENCY
AS A THIRTY-SEVEN YEAR OLD
DAvm L. RATNER*
The Securities and Exchange Commission was established by sec-
tion 4 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The laws it administers
were all enacted between 1934 and 1940, with only relatively minor
changes since that time. It has attracted, during the past thirty-seven
years, as Commissioners and staff members, some of the ablest people
to enter American public life. It has never been subject to any serious
charges of impropriety or political influence, and it has probably the
best reputation of any of the federal regulatory agencies, both in the
business community and among disinterested observers.
Within the past year or so, however, the agency has been subjected
to serious criticism. It has been faulted particularly for its alleged fail-
ure to take strong enough action to prevent the recent debacle in the
securities industry, which posed the most serious threat to public con-
fidence in the securities markets since the early 1930's. It has been
criticized more generally for its failure to respond promptly and flexibly
to changes in the securities markets, to plan for future developments,
and even to deal expeditiously with its own backlog of work in its
established fields of activity.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the SEC's apparent suc-
cesses and alleged failures, and to see to what extent they reflect gen-
uine accomplishments or deficiencies in dealing with the problems
committed to the agency's jurisdiction.
"SuccEss" FAcTORs
One important factor in the SEC's past success has been the nature
of the activity which it regulates. The securities business, unlike other
regulated industries, is not a natural monopoly situation. Generally,
any number of firms can enter any part of the securities business, and
any number of companies can sell their shares to the public. Therefore,
the SEC has generally been spared the difficult and politically treach-
erous task of choosing between competing applicants for a limited
number of franchises, a task which has contributed to the low estate
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of the Federal Communications Commission and the Civil Aeronautics
Board.
Second, the securities business has been a relatively specialized one,
engaged in by a determinable number of firms with easily categorized
functions or combinations of functions. The SEC thus has a relatively
well-defined, well-organized and manageable constituency, unlike such
agencies as the Federal Trade Commission, which must dissipate their
energies on thousands of individual cases in a multitude of different
industries, with little opportunity to formulate or gain acceptance of
rules of general applicability. The current and rapid trend toward
absorption of securities firms into financial or industrial conglomerates,
however, is already complicating the SEC's labors. It will do so to an
increasing extent, not only because of the increasing complexity of the
operations of the regulated companies but also by bringing the SEC
into areas of overlap and conflict with the agencies that regulate the
other activities of the conglomerate enterprises.
A third important factor in the SEC's good reputation has been
the limited role assigned to it in regulating the securities business. The
SEC has no power to make economic determinations either as to the
merits of any particular security or investment recommendation, or
as to the most efficient ordering of the securities business. The few areas
in which the Commission has been called on to make economic deter-
minations, such as its review of stock exchange commission rates, have
been among its most controversial activities.
A fourth factor in the SEC's success - perhaps even the most
important - is the general upward trend of the stock market during
the thirty-seven years of the SEC's existence. Public investors who are
showing substantial profits on their securities investments are less likely
to criticize practices in the industry, or the agency which regulates it,
than customers of an industry which has not done well by them.
This catalogue of external factors, of course, tells only part of the
story. There are agencies with limited roles in successful industries
that have acquired very bad reputations. To determine why the SEC
was, until recently, so highly regarded, and why its reputation is cur-
rently suffering, one must examine the goals which the agency has set
for itself, or have been set for it, and see how it has handled each of
them.
GoAis AND PROGRAMS
In 1965, the SEC was instructed to design a "Planning-Program-
ming-Budgeting System" -a concept developed in the Defense De-
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partment which the Bureau of the Budget was attempting to adapt
for use by all government agencies. The essence of the system was that
each agency should first define its goals and sub-goals, then evaluate
the alternative techniques of achieving those goals, and finally allocate
its manpower and its budget to reach its goals in the most effective and
efficient way. The basic purpose, of course, was to make government
budgeting a more managerial and less political process. One can debate
the merits of this purpose, as an overall matter, but within the limited
world of securities regulation it makes a good deal of sense.
A small group was organized within the SEC, including representa-
tives of each of the divisions and offices, to study how the proposed
budgeting system could be adopted to serve the needs of the agency.
However, the idea met with a good deal of resistance from some of the
top staff people, who took the position that their job was to enforce
the law, and that the only problem was that they were understaffed and
needed more money to do the job properly. This resistance was prob-
ably attributable in large part to the natural reluctance of someone
who has devoted most of his life to a certain activity to ask whether
that activity serves any useful purpose. The possible consequences of
a negative answer are too frightening. The attitude varied greatly
among the three major divisions, however, and from individual to
individual within each division, and the study group was able to achieve
modest progress in provoking analyses of how time was in fact being
spent and where alternative procedures should at least be considered.
The study group had only limited success in attempting to define
an overall goal for the Commission. There was agreement that it had
something to do with the establishment and maintenance of public
confidence in the securities markets. But whether this was the principal
goal, or a step toward a goal of more efficient allocation of capital, or
a by-product of protection of investors seemed to depend on whether
the question was approached from the viewpoint of a sociologist, or
an economist, or a lawyer.
The group concluded that the goal of public confidence did not
require or empower the Commission to try to prevent investors from
losing money, but rather to try to see that investors who did lose money
(as well as those who made money) did not feel that they had been
treated unfairly. In other words, the result of an investment should de-
pend on factors which an investor could reasonably contemplate at the
time he made it. To reach this goal, the Commission has four broad
programs:
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(1) Obtaining timely public disclosure of material information
about the issuers of securities.
(2) Preventing or discouraging unfair practices in the securities
markets.
(3) Regulating the actual operation of the securities markets.
(4) Preventing or discouraging unfair activities by the managers
of investment companies.
There are also two other programs of a "mopping-up" nature that
occupy a relatively small part of the Commission's time at present:
rationalization of the structure of public utility holding companies,
which was largely completed in the 1930's and 1940's, and participation
in bankruptcy reorganizations.
Disclosure
Of the four major programs, the one which has been most respon-
sible for enhancing the Commission's reputation is the disclosure
program, particularly that part of it spelled out in the Securities Act
of 1933. The form and content of the disclosure that a company is re-
quired to make when it sells securities to the American public is quite
properly considered, within and without the SEC, as the agency's most
significant achievement.
Acceptance by issuers and underwriters of the appropriateness of
full disclosure was not automatic. It was greatly facilitated by the de-
cision made in the early years that the SEC staff would review registra-
tion statements and assist in improving the disclosures they contained
rather than waiting for misstatements to be made and applying the for-
mal sanctions of the law. This informal method of proceeding, involv-
ing deficiency letters, undertakings and other mechanisms not mentioned
in the statute, has made it possible for knowledgeable issuers and
underwriters to comply fully with SEC disclosure requirements while
making their public offerings with a minimum of disruption to their
established procedures. This accommodation has been facilitated by
their recognition that, for reasons discussed below, specific phrases and
disclosures that the SEC requires a company to put in its registration
statement, however offensive they may be to company officers, have
relatively little effect on the marketability of the stock issue.
A side effect of this informality, however, has been to increase
the premium on expertise among the people who handle registration
statements, particularly the lawyers. A lawyer or firm who has never
handled an SEC registration before is at a substantial disadvantage in
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trying to get a statement through the SEC. Even if he can struggle
through the formal requirements laid out in the law and regulations,
he must turn to scattered secondary sources to find out about the
informal procedures and turns of phrase that will ease his path through
the administrative process.
The most serious question, though, about the SEC's disclosure
program is not whether it has unduly fattened the pockets of a certain
segment of the legal profession but whether it has served the basic pur-
pose of fostering public confidence in securities. The answer is assuredly
yes. Securities of American corporations enjoy unparalleled acceptance,
not only among American investors but in other countries as well, an
acceptance which is attributable in significant measure to the amount
and type of information that is available about their affairs.
To what extent is this confidence justified? To what extent have
the SEC's disclosure requirements and its much publicized proceedings
against people who trade on the basis of inside information helped
ordinary investors to avoid losses resulting from factors which they
could not reasonably have anticipated at the time they made their
investments? Here the answer is a mixed one: the SEC requirements
have probably helped a great deal, but not for the reasons which are
commonly advanced to justify them.
The standard statement about the SEC's disclosure requirements
is that they are designed to give the potential investor the material
facts that he needs for an informed investment decision. There are
a number of problems with this: (1) more than 99 percent of all securi-
ties purchases are made in transactions to which the 1933 Act disclosure
requirements are inapplicable, and the disclosures required by the
1934 Act are often obsolete and not readily available; (2) in purchases
to which the 1933 Act is applicable, there is no requirement that the
purchaser get any information until after the transaction is completed;
(3) the information given to the purchaser is often so complicated that
he would need professional help to decipher it; (4) accounting rules
are so flabby that it is hard to draw meaningful comparisons between
the financial statements of different companies, even those of companies
in the same industry; (5) in a very large percentage of cases, the invest-
ment decision is made on the basis of factors which have nothing to do
with the information that the company is required to disclose.
The real salutary effects of the disclosure requirements, I would
suggest, have been two. The first was to accustom corporate managers
to making public a great deal of information about the company's affairs.
Although a particular publicly-held company may only be required
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to comply with 1933 Act disclosure requirements on rare occasions,
those occasions are enough to demonstrate to management that dis-
closure is not detrimental to business, that in fact it can be used (and
even abused) to help the company's business by broadening the market
for its securities. This "Consciousness II" is one toward which corporate
managers in other countries, without the prod of the SEC's disclosure
requirements, are only now beginning to grope their way.
The second benefit, arising from the requirement of disclosing
compensation arrangements and other transactions with directors, of-
ficers and controlling persons, has been an upgrading of corporate
managers' sense of responsibility to their institutions. There are many
questionable arrangements which corporate managers will set up for
themselves if they can do so in secret, but which they will not set up if
they have to be disclosed on a public record. The motivation may
be fear of lawsuits, or simply embarrassment, but, regardless of the
exact cause, I would guess that the SEC's disclosure requirements have
deterred more questionable deals than all the substantive rules laid
down in state corporation laws or court decisions.
After its initial breakthrough in gaining acceptance of the 1933 Act
disclosure procedure, however, the SEC has in recent years devoted
massive portions of its time to prescribing the exact form in which 1933
Act disclosures must be made and the precise dividing line between
the situations in which 1933 Act registration is or is not required. This
progressive ritualization has been encouraged by the rigid pyramidal
structure of the Division of Corporation Finance, which administers
the disclosure provisions, and by the growth of a large body of lawyers
both within and without the SEC, whose careers are built on the re-
peated application of the formulas they have learned and polished.
The point here is not that the disclosure provisions are being
ineffectively administered. It is rather that the SEC, with limited re-
sources, is applying most of them to a very limited class of transactions
and leaving vast areas virtually unpatrolled. A couple of years ago, a
study group under the direction of Commissioner Francis M. Wheat,
came up with some sensible recommendations for reducing the dis-
parity in disclosure requirements between companies that are currently
engaged in offering securities to the public, and companies that are
not. However, after an initial rash of favorable comment from outside
the Commission and the proposal by the Commission of a new set of
rules to implement the study group's recommendations, the project
apparently succumbed to the general lethargy now pervading the Com-
mission, and the agency went back to tinkering with the old distinc-
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tions, in a manner that bids fair to make the disparities worse than they
were before.
This is an unfortunate development, since it creates a danger that
leadership on the disclosure issue will pass from the SEC to other insti-
tutions. If the rationalization of disclosure requirements is done by
Congress at a time when there is no public outcry against the financial
disclosure practices of public corporations the leadership will probably
be taken by business-oriented groups and the rules will be changed so
as to eliminate requirements which business executives find bother-
some.
Prevention of Unfair Practices
In terms of total man-hours, the largest portion of Commission
resources is devoted to what it calls its enforcement program - inspec-
tions, investigations, administrative proceedings, injunctive actions and
criminal prosecutions involving broker-dealers and others who may have
engaged in "fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive" practices. Like any
policing and prosecuting operation, this program requires the exercise
of a great deal of discretion at all stages, since the Commission's re-
sources are obviously inadequate to investigate and follow through on
every suspicion of a securities law violation.
It is very hard to evaluate how well this discretion is being exer-
cised. Indeed, the Division of Trading and Markets, which has princi-
pal responsibility for enforcement activities, has only a very rough idea
of how much time is being spent in going after various categories of
improper practices. But even detailed statistics on this subject would
not lead to any firm conclusion about how well the Commission does
in discouraging improper acts and in discovering those that were com-
mitted.
Given its limited resources and the enormous number of securities
transactions taking place every day, the key to the Commission's success
is leverage. The relatively few proceedings which it is able to carry
through to completion must be carefully chosen to achieve the maxi-
mum impact in terms of state enforcement activities, disciplinary
actions by industry self-regulatory organizations and, most important,
self-restraint by those who engage in the securities business or in securi-
ties transactions. A single proceeding such as the Texas Gulf Sulphur
case, while it involves a large expenditure of Commission time on a
single series of incidents, may produce enormous changes in terms of
development and re-examination of standards by the managers of every
publicly-held corporation in the country. And the increasing number
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of proceedings brought by the Commission in the last few years against
large stock exchange member firms have undoubtedly produced im-
provements in internal surveillance procedures that will save large
numbers of customers from being imposed upon by over-aggressive
and under-scrupulous salesmen.
On the other hand, the Commission must continue to deal with
the small fly-by-night operators in proceedings that make no new law and
involve relatively small numbers of customers and small amounts of
money, simply because the violations are so outrageous that they cannot
be overlooked. If one of the cheated customers is a friend of an influ-
ential Congressmen, there is extra pressure on the SEC to do something
about the situation. This is not necessarily a bad thing. In terms of the
overall goal of maintaining public confidence in the securities markets,
a high congressional regard for the SEC's effectiveness in dealing
with wrongdoers is an important asset.
Of more questionable value is the Commission's continuing cam-
paign to maintain jurisdiction to the farthest boundaries of the word
"security," including accounts in savings and loan associations, and in-
terests in orange groves, beavers, and any other enterprises in which the
investor hopes to profit from the efforts of others. There is no doubt
that many of these cases have involved fraudulent or potentially fraudu-
lent activities, and that bringing them under the federal securities
laws may give defrauded buyers, as well as the Government, better
grounds for judicial relief. On the other hand, these activities are
highly specialized and often local in character, and there is little reason
to believe that they impair public confidence in the markets for securi-
ties, as that term is commonly understood.
Another complication in the SEC's enforcement program is re-
gional variation. Oil and gas ventures, which raise peculiar problems,
are concentrated in a few geographical areas. Aggressive sales practices
which are standard in Los Angeles would evoke cries of horror in
Boston. Trading practices in penny mining stocks that are considered
a normal aspect of speculation in the Northwest would probably be
looked upon as outright manipulation in other parts of the country.
Since a majority of the Commission's enforcement personnel is
located in its regional and branch offices spread around the country,
enforcement patterns tend to reflect these regional differences in prac-
tices and attitudes. There is also a measure of tension between regional
administrators, particularly those who have been with the Commission
for many years, and the directors of the enforcement operation in
Washington, whose objective is to achieve greater uniformity of stan-
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dards for inspections, investigations and proceedings as well as greater
flexibility in moving personnel from one area of the country to another
to meet changes in the incidence of various kinds of violations. On
balance, the regional offices, with about 40 percent of the total staff,
increase the Commission's political acceptability because of their re-
sponsiveness to local conditions and attitudes. On the other hand, they
impede the development and implementation of new or uniform en-
forcement programs because of communication difficulties and the
fact that regional office staffs are more directly responsive to the re-
gional administrator who is there than to the overall policy director
who is in Washington. To the extent that new regional administrators
are appointed from the Washington office or from another regional
office, both of these influences are reduced, at least for a while.
Market Regulation
The Commission's third major program is regulation of the securi-
ties markets. This program is considerably more nebulous than the dis-
closure and enforcement programs described above, and has occupied
considerably less of the Commission's attention, at least until the last
few years. The 1934 Act ratified, and the 1938 amendments extended,
the role of organizations of broker-dealers, particularly national securi-
ties exchanges and associations, in regulating the conduct of the securi-
ties business. While the Commission was given broad powers to review
and change the rules of these self-regulatory organizations it was for
many years extremely hesitant to exercise these powers in a vigorous
way. This hesitancy was due in part to the political power of the in-
dustry organizations, which in turn rested heavily on the traditional
American belief that businessmen know more about how business
should be run than government officials do, and in part to the Com-
mission's actual incapacity to conduct the sort of extensive inquiry
that would enable it to establish the case for changes in the way the
game is played.
This situation has completely changed in the last decade. First,
the special study which was conducted for the Commission in 1961-1963
not only gave the Commission the type of information it needed for
recommending changes, but in fact put it far ahead of the industry in
terms of knowledge of how the securities business operated. It also at-
tracted to the Commission a new group of outstanding staff members
with the desire and ability to work for the elimination of obsolete,
unfair or inefficient practices in the securities business.
Second, the growth of institutional investors during the current
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decade wrought great changes in the economics of the securities busi-
ness and put increasing pressures on market mechanisms and arrange-
ments which had been developed to serve a different kind of clientele.
Third, a series of antitrust attacks on the rule-making power of the
self-regulatory organizations has put them in a position where they
must show that not only changes in their rules, but also all of their
existing rules, are necessary to make the 1934 Act work. This in effect
requires them to justify all of their rules to the SEC, rather than the
SEC having to justify suggested changes to them.
Fourth, the notorious "back office" problem which resulted from
a sudden increase in trading volume, followed by the collapse of a
number of leading firms, indicated not only to outsiders but also to the
industry itself that it had been woefully deficient in planning and im-
plementing the improvements in procedures, and in the internal struc-
ture of the firms, which were required to handle the new kinds and
amounts of business.
While an uninformed government agency might find it difficult
to attack the rules of a united and stable industry enjoying general
public confidence and an assumed exemption from the antitrust laws,
it is quite another matter for a well-informed government agency to
tackle the rules of an industry racked by change and internal dissen-
sion, drowning in the consequences of its own success, and required to
justify a complex of anticompetitive restraints that its own members
have been exercising their utmost ingenuity to evade. In short, there
was an excellent opportunity for the Commission to participate actively
in a major rethinking of the complex of rules and practices under
which the securities business operates.
The Commission's initial effort was to move the discussion into a
public forum rather than the private discussion approach which was
previously followed in matters of industry self-regulation on economic
matters. When the New York Stock Exchange, at the beginning of
1968, proposed changes in its rate structure designed to preserve and
strengthen the position of its members, the SEC invited public com-
ment on them. It simultaneously invited comment on a provocative
antifraud rule, designed to spotlight the fact that the NYSE was trying
to preserve its fixed minimum commissions and at the same time pre-
serve the devices by which its members evaded that rate schedule for
their own benefit. The package drew many comments, the most signifi-
cant being a submission by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Depart-
ment to the effect that it found no legal or economic justification for
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fixed minimum commission rates, and that the SEC should move as
rapidly as possible to eliminate them, starting with large transactions.
The intervention of the Antitrust Division was in itself sufficient
to trigger the calling of a public hearing on stock exchange commission
rates, which the Commission opened in July 1968. This proceeding,
which is still officially in progress, illustrates at the same time the
political strength and the analytical weakness of the public hearing
procedure for dealing with a complex subject like commission rates.
The political potency of a public hearing was demonstrated, first, by
the SEC's ability to force a reduction in the commission rates for large
transactions, second, by its ability to require the stock exchanges to
eliminate minimum commissions on all transactions over $500,000,
and, third, and most surprisingly, by a public acknowledgement by
the President of the New York Stock Exchange in that it was in the
long-term interest of the Exchange to eliminate the fixed minimum
rates which had been a basic part of its rules since its foundation in 1792.
These remarkable results of the SEC's public hearing were due
in large part, paradoxically, to the agency's demonstration of its com-
plete inability to conduct the economic analysis which was supposedly
the purpose of the hearing. Neither SEC criticisms of Stock Exchange
proposals, nor its own directives to the Exchange, were supported by
even a shred of economic analysis. And the hearings dragged on so long
that the securities industry went through a complete boom-and-bust
cycle while the hearings were underway. This experience undoubtedly
helped to convince the Stock Exchange leaders that the reality of
SEC rate supervision, the specter of which they had relied upon to
justify their claimed exemption from the antitrust laws, was more fear-
some than the threat of rate competition which they had been fighting
for 175 years. The underlying truth, of course, is that rate regulation
of the type which has been traditionally applied (with mixed results)
to heavy-capital, natural-monopoly industries such as electric power
is almost impossible to apply to a fluid and highly competitive business
like securities. The SEC has perhaps performed a notable service to
the securities business and to the country, by demonstrating its incompe-
tence for rate regulation before building up an establishment dedicated
to the preservation of a regulatory system.
Investment Companies
The Commission's fourth major program, the regulation of invest-
ment companies, started with its study of investment companies
1971]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
authorized by section 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935. The Investment Company Act of 1940 gave the Commission
some specific and limited powers to deal with certain recognized abuses,
but for the first twenty-five years its principal activity under that Act
was the granting of exemptions from rigid statutory prohibitions.
The rapid growth of mutual funds commencing in the 1950's led
to a series of studies done by or for the Commission which culminated
in its recommendation to Congress in 1966 of new legislation designed
principally to reduce the management fees and sales loads being charged
by mutual funds. The approach taken by the Commission in recom-
mending this legislation is interesting. It did not view the mutual fund
as a means of mass-marketing a prepackaged investment service, which
is what it clearly is, and urge that it be regulated as such. It started
with the proposition that a mutual fund is a corporation. However,
its managers receive compensation which often greatly exceeds the
salaries of the directors and officers of other corporations, and the
commissions on the sale of its shares are substantially higher than
those on the sale of other securities. Therefore, something must be
wrong, the competitive system is not working, and regulation is needed.
This approach was either very naive, or very clever, or perhaps
both. From one point of view, one could say that the Commission
was so accustomed to dealing with the issuance of securities by corpo-
rations, and the fiduciary obligations of corporate managers, that it
simply fit this new problem into the standard mold. The history of
the SEC's application of 1933 Act disclosure requirements to mutual
funds supports this interpretation. The prospectuses of mutual funds,
and particularly periodic payment plans, which are generally sold to
the least sophisticated segment of the investing public, are often more
complex and formidable than the prospectuses of industrial companies,
which are intended in large part to serve the needs of trained financial
analysts.
On the other hand, the SEC approach can be looked upon as a
very sophisticated way of obtaining a modicum of economic regulation
by dressing it up as a logical application of existing legal standards.
It is easier to convince a legislator to hold people accountable for
breaches of their fiduciary duty than to impose price controls on a non-
monopoly industry in which almost none of the customers are com-
plaining. It is hard to quarrel with success, and the fact that the
Commission, with virtually no public support and strong industry
opposition, managed to push a modified version of its bill through
Congress in slightly over four years offers some testimonial to its
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approach, as well as to its accumulated good will with the Congress.
The fact that the new law doesn't really do much is probably attribu-
table more to the fact that it was not directed at a very significant
problem than to any lack of zeal on the SEC's part.
CONCLUSION
In the light of this very brief survey of the SEC's programs, what
conclusions can be drawn as to how well the Commission has been
carrying out the basic mandate given to it in 1934? If the basic mea-
sure is public confidence in the honesty and utility of the securities
markets, the Commission has done well, and certain parts of its pro-
grams have clearly contributed to the preservation of that confidence.
There were major market breaks in 1962 and 1969, and many
investors who had put money into speculative hot issues registered
under the 1933 Act lost substantial sums. The fact that there was no
generalized public outcry and call for reform indicates that the dis-
closure program, as administered by the SEC, helped to convince many
investors that they were the victims of their own over-enthusiasm
rather than someone else's misdeeds.
On the other hand, there was a generalized public outcry over
the recent failure of securities firms to handle adequately the public
business which they had actively solicited, followed by the failure of
larger firms and a concomitant threat that customers would be unable
to recover the money and securities they had left with those firms for
safekeeping. In this area at least, the SEC did not live up to public
expectations concerning the degree of supervision and control it was
exercising over the firms that were supposedly subject to its regulation.
I am not sure, however, how much of this regulatory failure can
be laid to the SEC as an institution and how much is due to outside
political forces. The 1934 Act appears to give the SEC almost unlimited
supervisory power over the rules and practices of securities exchanges
and the NASD, but the exercise of that power is limited by the
political constraints that the industry can bring to bear through its
considerable influence on the executive and legislative branches of the
Government.
At the time the securities industry's problems were building up
in the late 1960's, the Commission's attempts, through an aggressive
chairman and staff, to force changes in industry structure and prac-
tices, combined with its espousal of changes in the laws governing
mutual funds, aroused the violent opposition of the more conservative
elements of the industry. This in turn led to President Nixon's 1968
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campaign pledge (expressed in a private letter to industry members) to
end "heavy-handed bureaucratic regulation" by the SEC, and to his
appointment in February 1969 of a new chairman with a distinctly
more conservative view of the role of a government agency in dealing
with a regulated industry. Thus, when the storm broke, the Commis-
sion was unable to offer significant leadership to the industry in work-
ing its way out of its difficulties. Furthermore, since there was at that
time no insurance protection for the customers of the securities firms,
the Commission was constrained in giving publicity to the industry's
difficulties, for fear of inciting mass withdrawals of securities and funds,
which might hasten the downfall of firms that would otherwise have
an opportunity to bring their operations under control.
The greatest current challenge to the SEC's reputation, however,
as well as to the securities business, is the increasing domination of the
equity markets by institutional investors. The Commission apparently
found it difficult to formulate recommendations on the basis of its
recently completed economic study of the impact of institutional in-
vestors, and it is noteworthy that the suggestion for the study came
from Congress, not the Commission, at a time when the Commission's
sights were fixed on excessive management fees and sales loads as its
central concern.
Another factor which may impair the Commission's ability to deal
with this new generation of problems is the extent to which they
intermix securities market questions with questions of capital alloca-
tion, antitrust policy, tax policy, and regulation of banks, insurance
companies and other types of financial institutions. The members and
staff of the Commission will find it difficult working in these un-
familiar areas and being required to coordinate their policies with
those of other agencies set up for different purposes. However, the
rapid growth of financial service conglomerates, including the com-
bination of mutual fund and insurance company sales organizations,
the expansion of banks into the pooled investment field, and the move
toward public ownership (i.e., conglomerate acquisition) of stock ex-
change member firms, will force the Commission to a choice. Either
it must draw in its horns and concentrate on its traditional area of
jurisdiction, safeguarding its reputation at the expense of losing its
significance, or it will get out and fight for a significant piece of the
action in dealing with a conglomerate economy, accepting the risks of
unpopularity that a vigorous policy-making role entails.
